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INCOME REGULATION OF FUTURE INTERESTS IN PART-
NERSHIPS PROFITS AND LOSSES-TAXATION-FEDERAL IN-
COmE TAx -Diamond v. Commissioner (T.C. 1970)
It is well established that an interest in partnership capital re-
ceived as compensation for personal services is taxable income to
the recipient in the year in which the capital right is transferred.1
It had been generally accepted that an interest in future partner-
ship profits and losses was not taxable in the year of receipt.2 The
Tax Court in Diamond v. Commissioner,3 however, determined that
income is realized upon receipt of an interest in future partnership
profits and losses when such an interest is compensation for services
already rendered.
Sol Diamond was a mortgage broker who obtained clients for the
Marshall Savings and Loan Association of Illinois. In 1961 he was
approached by Phillip Kargman who desired to procure a $1.1 mil-
lion full purchase price loan on a specific property in Chicago. Un-
der the agreement between Diamond and Kargman, Diamond re-
ceived a 60% interest in profits and losses for a term of 24 years as
compensation for his aid in procuring this loan. Other pertinent
provisions of the agreement termed the relationship a joint venture
and provided that all capital was to be furnished by Kargman, who
would have sole control over the management of the business and
would be entitled to recoup his capital investment upon liquida-
tion prior to the 60-40 distribution of the gain or loss.
1. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (1) (1954); see United States v. Frazell,
335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964), affd on rehearing, 339 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1965),
cert. den., 380 U.S. 961 (1965).
2. See Bybee, The Taxwise Ways of Oil and Gas Operations and Sales
of Interests, N.Y.U. 27th INST. ON FED. TAx. 931, 941 (1969); Nassau, Tax
Considerations in Writing Partnership Agreements: Suggested Clauses,
N.Y.U. 26th INsT. ON FED. TAx. 125, 129 (1968); Nicholson, Interests in
Partnership Capital Received in Exchange for Services, N.Y.U. 19th INsT.
ON FED. TAX. 227, 241 (1961); Weissman, Problems in Transferring a Part-
nership Interest as Compensation for Services, 25 J. TAX. 162 (.1966); Whit-
man, How a Partner Whose Primary Contribution is Services May Achieve
Capital Gain, N.Y.U. 22d INsT. ON FED. Tix. 653 (1964); but see, 2 HousT.
L. REV. 411, 415 n.23, recognizing that there is no specific statutory exclu-
sion from income of an interest in future profits and therefore this posi-
tion may be without authority.
3. Diamond v. Comm., Nos. 3260-65, 2989-66 (56 T.C. -, No. 42, June 21,
1971) [hereinafter cited as Diamond).
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Diamond sold this interest three weeks after the execution of the
contract and reported the sales price as a short-term capital gain.
4
The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's contention that the sales
price was ordinary income and not capital gain. In denying capi-
tal gains treatment the Tax Court held that a future interest in part-
nership profits and losses was taxable to the extent of the fair
market value immediately upon receipt of such interest.
The holding is objectionable on three grounds. First, the court's
interpretation of section 1.721 of the Regulations is arguably not
shared by either the Treasury or the Congress; second, the valuation
of such an interest will create difficulties and inequities; and third,
the holding was not necessary to reach the result the court desired.
In addition, the effect of the 1969 Tax Reform Act must be consid-
ered to ascertain the current treatment of the interests discussed in
Diamond.
Mr. Diamond contended that a taxpayer who receives a partner-
ship interest as compensation for services is required to account for
that interest as ordinary income only if he receives an interest in
partnership capital, but not if he receives only the right to share in
the partnership's future profits and losses. He relied primarily
upon section 7215 as interpreted by 1.721-1(b) (1) of the Regulations.0
Section 721 provides that no gain or loss will be recognized to a
partner when he contributes property in exchange for an interest in
4. The reclassification of this item as ordinary income resulted in a
deficiency because it thereby became unavailable to absorb a reported
short-term capital loss which was then required to be used as an off-set
against a reported long-term capital gain.
Other issues not discussed in this article were Diamond's attempted
deduction as business expenses of payments remitted to Marshall Savings
and Loan.
5. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954 § 721 provides:
SEC. 721. NoiNRcoGNmoN OF GAmN OR Loss oN CONTRIMUON
No gain or loss shall be recognized to a partnership or to any of
its partners in the case of a contribution of property to the part-
nership in exchange for an interest in the partnership.
All section references in the text are to the INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954.
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (1) (1954)
REGULATIONS SEC. 1.721-1
(b) (1) Normally under local law, each partner is entitled to be
repaid his contributions of money or other property to the partner-
ship (at the value placed upon such property by the partnership at
the time of the contribution) whether made at the formation of the
partnership or subsequent thereto. To the extent that any of the
partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contribu-
tions (as distinguished from a share in the partnership profits) in
favor of another partner as compensation for services (or in sat-
isfaction of an obligation) section 721 does not apply. The value of
an interest in partnership so transferred to a partner as compen-
sation for services constitutes income to the partner under section
61...
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the partnership. Section 1.721-1(b) (1) of the Regulations states that
section 721 does not apply "to the extent that any of the partners
gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contributions (as
distinguished from a share in partnership profits) in favor of an-
other partner as compensation for services."
' 7
In examining the parenthetical phrase in the Regulations, the
court commented:
[A]lthough the meaning of the phrase was obscure, it at most
excludes that type of situation from the rule which the regulations
affirmatively set forth in respect of readjustments of capital in-
terests; but [section 721] does not deal one way or another with
situations described in the parenthetical phrase. 8
In effect, the Tax Court is stating that the interest in future profits
and losses given as compensation for services rendered were never
intended to fall within section 721 and that the parenthetical phrase
does not bar the immediate recognition of ordinary income. Thus,
consistency necessitates the inclusion in income of both capital and
future profit and loss interests when given for services rendered.
However, it can be argued that the parenthetical phrase indicates
that the Treasury sees a distinction between these two types of
interests sufficient to require a different treatment; namely, that
an interest in future profits and losses need not be recognized
immediately as ordinary income. The court, in fact, intimates
that there may be some kind "of equitable justification for giving
the parenthetic clause some limited form of affirmative operative
scope, as perhaps where there is a readjustment of partner's
shares to reflect 'current' services being performed by one of the
partners."9
Since it appears the Treasury may make such a distinction, it
is necessary to determine if Congress intended capital interests
and future profit and loss interests to be treated differently.
Section 721 was primarily a codification of pre-existing case law.'0
No specific indication of legislative intent can be drawn from the
committee reports during the formation of this section. However,
an indication of intent for section 721 may be inferred from pro-
7. Id.
8. Diamond, supra note 3.
9. Id.
10. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954); S. REP. No. 1622,
83rd Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1954).
posed section 770 covering the same subject matter." Section
770 was introduced in 1960 and passed by the House of Representa-
11. H.R. 9662, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960). Proposed see. 770, INT. REV.
CODE states:
SEC. 770. INTEREST IN PARTNERSHIP CAPITAL
EXCHANGED FOR SERVICES
(a) Treatment of Person Performing Services.-If a person re-
ceives an interest in the capital of a partnership in exchange for the
performance of services for the partnership-
(1) the amount determined under subsection (c) shall be in-
cluded in such person's gross income, and
(2) an amount equal to such amount shall be deemed to be a
contribution by such person to the partnership.
(b) Treatment of Partnership and of Partner Relinquishing In-
terest.-If any partner relinquishes an interest in the capital of a
partnership in exchange for the performance of services for such
partnership, no gain or loss shall be recognized to such partner on
the relinquishment and, with respect to the amount determined
under subsection (c)-
(1) The partnership shall be allowed a deduction, to the extent
such amount constitutes a trade or business expense (described in
section 162(a) ) to the partnership, and
(2) the adjusted basis of the partnership properties shall be in-
creased (in accordance with the services performed with respect to
each), to the extent such amount constitutes an amount properly
chargeable to capital account under section 1016 (a) (1).
Any deduction allowable under paragraph (1) shall be allocated
among the relinquishing partners (or their successors in interest)
on the basis of that portion of such deduction which is attributable
to each such partner.
(c) Amount To Be Taken Into Account; Time When Taken Into
Account.-
(1) In General-Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3)
for purposes of subsections (a) and (b) the amount determined
under this subsection-
(A) if the interest, at the time of the exchange, is not subject to
substantial restrictions or limitations as to its transferability shall
be taken into account at the time of the exchange, and shall be the
fair market value of the interest at such time, or
(B) if the interest at the time of the exchange is subject to sub-
stantial restrictions or limitations as to its transferability, shall be
taken into account at the time such restrictions or limitations cease
to be substantial or the interest is disposed of (other than by death,
where the substantial restrictions or limitations continue), which-
ever first occurs, and shall be the lesser of-
(i) the fair market value of the services, or
(ii) the fair market value the interest would have had at the
time of the exchange had there been no such restrictions or
limitations.
(2) Reduction of Amount for Unrealized Appreciation in Section
751 Assets.-The amount required to be taken into account under
paragraph (1) of this subsection for purposes of subsections (a)
and (b) shall be reduced to the extent the fair market value of
section 751 assets over their adjusted basis to the partnership.
(3) Limitation on Deduction Under Subsection (b) (1).-The
amount of the deduction under subsection (b) (1) shall not exceed
the aggregate amount determined by taking into account with re-
spect to each relinquishing partner, whichever of the foilowing is
the lesser:
(A) his adjusted basis (as of the time of the exchange) in the re-
linquished interest, or
(B) that portion of the amount determined under paragraph (1)
which is attributable to his relinquishment.
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tives,12 but the bill was tabled by the Senate for reasons apparently
unrelated to the bill or to this specific provision.' 3
Proposed section 770 dealt with the transfer of partnership
capital as compensation for services rendered. In addition to
treating the interest in capital as ordinary income, the section
provided the method for handling the partnership deduction of such
a transfer. It valued the capital interest at the lower of the fair
market value or the value subject to restrictions upon transfer-
ability.
1
This section was also intended (as was 721) to provide a clear
statutory basis for existing case law.' 5 This time, however, an
indication of congressional understanding of the existing case law
is found in the committee reports concerning the proposed legis-
lation.
The Senate committee report on 770 showed that the section is
to apply to capital interests only. If "such a service partner had
acquired only an interest in the appreciation of assets occurring
subsequent to his admission and in profits of the partnership
earned after such time, the rule of 770 would have no application."'16
A congressional intent to differentiate between interests in future
profits and losses and interests in capital is therefore evident.
Since these interests were to be treated differently under 770,
the difference had to be in recognition of income to the recipient.
If also excluded from the non-recognition provisions of 721, the
value of the interests would then be immediately included in gross
income under section 61.17
The Supreme Court has broadly construed section 61. It has held
that gross income even for a cash basis taxpayer was not limited to
cash, but included the fair market value of other items received.'
8
12. CONG. REC.: H. Res. 436, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 106 CoNG. REC. 2112
(1960).
13. Nicholson, Interest in Partnership Capital Received in Exchange for
Services, N.Y.U. 19th INsT. ON FED. TAX. 235, 239 (1961).
14. See note 11, supra.
15. H.R. REP. No. 1231, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960); S. REP. No. 1622,
86th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1960).
16. Id.
17. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 61.
18. Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1939); See also, LoBue v. United
States, 351 U.S. 243 (1956).
The test for recognition by the cash basis taxpayer has been ex-
panded to a factual question of "equivalency to cash," with the item
included as ordinary income to the extent of its fair market value.19
If applied to interests in future profits and losses, such an interpre-
tation would accord essentially the same treatment as is currently
accorded capital interest under 1.721-1 (b) (1) of the Regulations.
But such treatment would be opposed to presumed congressional in-
tent to treat these interests differently evidenced by section 770 and
to the intent of the Treasury evidenced by the Regulations.
The second objection to the Tax Court's holding in Diamond is
the problem of valuation. In Pounds v. U.S.,20 the taxpayer, a real
estate agent, received a percentage of the future profit upon resale
of the property in lieu of commission. The Court of Appeals held
that ordinary income could not be converted into capital gains by
measuring the value of compensation in terms of possible profits
from the future sale of land. The court also acknowledges the rec-
ognition problem, holding that the taxpayer was not required to
recognize the value of the right received until the property was re-
sold. It noted:
[A] serious valuation problem would accrue in determining the
present value of a right to receive future profits on real estate un-
der the control of a third person and that under-evaluation would
allow income clearly taxable at ordinary rate to be treated im-
properly as capital appreciation rupon sale of the interest].21
Other courts faced with a valuation problem have postponed in-
come recognition until the taxpayer recovers his basis. 22 The effect
of such a view would be to treat the income from future profit
and loss interests as ordinary income when the profit or loss for
each taxable year was recognized. This provides a treatment dif-
ferent from that of a capital interest, the value of which is recog-
nized when the interest itself (as opposed to the income from that
interest) is received. This treatment would be in accord with the
congressional and Treasury intent discussed above.
However, the Tax Court's position (that the fair market value of
an interest in future profit and losses must be recognized as ordi-
nary income when received) can be supported for the following rea-
sons. First, section 721 requires a contribution of property to the
partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership. In the
19. Cowden v. Comm., 289 F.2d 20, 24 (5th Cir. 1961).
20. 372 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1967).
21. Id. at 347-8.
22. See Burnett v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931) (sale of stock for per ton
iron royalty); Comm. v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1949) (sale
of stock for private annuity); Comm. v. Carter, 170 F.2d 911 (2d Cir. 1948).
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tax sense, property has generally been held not to include the right
to be compensated for personal services.
23
Secondly, as previously mentioned, section 61 is to be read broadly
and that in the absence of an express provision excluding it, that in-
come shall be recognized. Here, the taxpayer had received some-
thing of value (a right to future profits) and in some way should be
required to recognize this income when received.
24
Third, the valuation problem would be alleviated by using the
value of the services rendered, thus assessing the future right by in-
direct but otherwise acceptable means.2 5 The trend in the courts,
moreover, has been towards requiring immediate recognition even
in questions concerning difficult valuation problems.
26
Finally, the immediate recognition would follow generally ac-
cepted accounting principles by more closely matching revenue with
the period in which it was earned.
The third objection to the holding in Diamond is that the court
considered an unnecessary issue, when it decided whether the part-
nership interest had to be reported as ordinary income when re-
ceived. The pertinent issue was really whether the proceeds re-
ceived on the sale of the interest was ordinary income or capital
gain. Even if Diamond's interest was not recognized under sec-
tion 721 when received, he should not have been accorded capital
gains treatment upon the ultimate sale.
The Tax Court disregarded the well-settled rationale available to
them, as exemplified by Hort v. Commissioner and subsequent cases
which dealt solely with the question of capital gains treatment ver-
sus ordinary income. This approach is better suited to the fact
question involved.
23. See WILLIS, PARTNmEsmP TAXATION 55 (1957); INT. REV. CODE OF 1954
§ 351; Diamond, supra note 3 at n.14.
24. See note 18, supra.
25. United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962) (valuing marital status
by amount of divorce settlement).
26. Kleberg v. Comm., 43 B.T.A. 277 (1941), enunciated the old rule that
there must be a note, bond, or other evidence of indebtedness, but Cowden
v. Comm., 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961) expanded the test to a factual ques-
tion of "equivalency to cash". See also United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65
(1962); and INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 § 83, note 34 infra. But see Robinson
v. Comm., 44 T.C. 20 (1965); Edelman v. United States, 329 F.2d 950
(Ct. Cl. 1962).
In Hort v. Commissioner, the Court held that a lump sum payment
received as compensation for a release from future rent payments
was ordinary income and not capital gain.27 A similar position
was adopted in Jamison v. U.S., where the District Court held:
... Amounts received by a taxpayer in exchange for a contractual
right to receive future payments constitutes ordinary income,
and must be treated as ordinary income, even though as stated in
Hort the contractual right could be treated as property for some
purposes.28
Pounds v. U.S.29 extended this principle directly to rights to future
profits and losses received as compensation for services. Wilkinson
v. U.S. enunciated the general principle, stating broadly that "fu-
ture income can't be converted into capital gains. ' '30
Even in U.S. v. Frazell,3 1 relied on by the Tax Court in Diamond, -
the Fifth Circuit had no difficulty holding that the recipient of a
partnership interest could not claim capital gains treatment since
the interest was given for services rendered in an oil exploration
venture. The court reached their decision without reference to the
interest in future profits and losses inherent in the interest received.
In fact, the court specifically omitted (by use of elipses) that por-
tion of 1.721-1 (b) (1) dealing with future profit and loss interests.8
When received for services after 1969, the treatment of these in-
terests is further complicated by the addition of section 83 .' This
section covers property received in connection with the performance
of services. It provides that the fair market value of property
transferred in exchange for the services shall be included in the
gross income of the recipient in the taxable year in which the trans-
fer is complete.
27. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
28. 297 F. Supp. 221, 225 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
29. See note 20, supra.
30. 304 F.2d 469, 474 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
31. See note 1, supra.
32. Diamond, supra note 3.
33. United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487 (5th Cir. 1964). See note 1 and
31, supra.
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 83 states:
SEC. 83. PROPERTY TRANSFERRED IN CONNECTION WITH
PERFORMANCE OF SERVICES.
(a) General rule.-If, in connection with the performance of serv-
ices, property is transferred to any person other than the person
for whom such services are performed, the excess of-
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without
regard to any restriction which by its terms will never lapse) at
the first time the rights of the person having the beneficial interest
in such property are transferable or are not subject to a substan-
tial risk of forfeiture, whichever occurs earlier, ...
(e) Applicability of section.-This section shall not apply to-
(1) a transaction to which section 421 applies.
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For the purposes of this section, property is defined to include
both realty and personalty other than money and an unfunded or
unsecured promise to pay deferred compensation. 35 The section
makes no distinction between capital interests and profit and loss
interests. If each is considered property, then the receipt of either
one should produce taxable income.
Several arguments can be made against the applicability of sec-
tion 83 to one or both types of interests. In the first place, without
any specific reference to partnership interests in section 83 commit-
tee reports, section 770 congressional intent, previously discussed,
should control to treat profit and loss interests differently. 36 This
result is not possible if both interests are included within section 83.
Moreover, despite the broad definition of property under section
83, the promise to pay future profits could be considered an unse-
cured or unfunded promise to pay deferred compensation and there-
fore excluded. The exclusion of these interests as unfunded or un-
secured should be controlled by the facts of the transaction. Rights
to future profits are generally not funded in any way prior to dis-
tribution by the partnership.
And finally, unlike corporate stock, the right to future partner-
ship profits may exist independently of an interest in partnership
capital and therefore be much more difficult to value. Section 83
does take note of some valuation problems by excluding from im-
mediate recognition the value of stock options (funded or unfunded)
where the market value is not readily ascertainable.37 However, it
makes no such provision for other types of property. In the absence
(2) a transfer to or from a trust described in section 401 (a) or
a transfer under an annuity plan which meets the requirements of
section 404(a) (2).
(3) the transfer of an option without a readily ascertainable
fair market value, or
(4) the transfer of property pursuant to the exercise of an
option with a readily ascertainable fair market value at the date of
grant.
35. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3 (e), 36 Fed. Reg. 10788 (1971) states:
(e) Property. For purposes of section 83 and the regulations
thereunder, the term "property" includes both realty and person-
alty other than money and other than an unfunded and unsecured
promise to pay deferred compensation.
36. H.R. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969); S. REP. No. 413, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
37. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83, see note 35, supra.
of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, it can be argued that the
exception should be extended to include profit and loss interests.
The current treatment of future profit and loss interests is de-
pendent upon the applicability of section 83. If this section is ap-
plicable to these interests, Diamond has no value as precedent to
cases arising subsequent to 1969. The income from these interests
would be recognized upon receipt of the interest itself.
Even if section 83 is found to be inapplicable, the holding in Dia-
mond is of questionable value. Although the Tax Court was justi-
fied in rejecting the generally accepted interpretation that future
profit and loss interests were included under the non-recognition
provisions of section 721,38 it went too far in its holding. For the
reasons previously discussed it does not necessarily follow that the
exclusion from section 721 requires the interests to be immediately
recognized as ordinary income. In fact, it is quite possible that the
rationale of the general acceptance of section 721 applicability89
was based upon these reasons and not upon a thorough study of the
statutory basis, since the effect of either theory is deferral of rec-
ognition.
The value of Diamond as precedent is further minimized by the
nature of the case itself. Mr. Diamond's frequent trips to the Tax
Court" and the Commissioner's contention that Diamond's dealings
with Marshall Savings and Loan "constituted a criminal violation
under section 1006 Title 16 of the U.S. Code" 41 may have influenced
the Tax Court's decision.
The holding in Diamond should not be considered as conclusive
and that immediate inclusion of the fair market value of future
partnership profit and loss interests should be challenged.
S. F. POUCHER
38. See note 2, supra.
39. Id.
40. Diamond v. Comm., 22 T.C.M. 229 (1963).
41. Diamond, supra note 3 at n.11.
